Copyright 2017 by Todd Shaw

Printed in U.S.A.
Vol. 112, No. 3

RATIONALIZING RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW
Todd W. Shaw
ABSTRACT—As a government attorney defending economic legislation
from a constitutional challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment—How
would you rate your chances of success? Surely excellent. After all,
hornbook constitutional law requires only the assembly of a flimsy
underlying factual record for economic legislation to pass rational basis
review.
But the recent uptick in courts questioning the credibility of
legislative records might give pause to your optimism. As a growing body
of scholarship has identified, the Supreme Court and federal courts of
appeals increasingly invalidate laws under rational basis review despite the
presence of an otherwise constitutionally sufficient legislative record.
Under this “credibility-questioning” rational basis review, courts both
ignore post hoc rationales that would legitimate a government interest and
scrutinize the fit between the challenged statute’s means and ends.
Nevertheless, recent scholarship has overlooked why courts have, and
should, engage in credibility-questioning rational basis review, particularly
of economic legislation.
This Note proposes an answer: Courts should apply credibilityquestioning rational basis review to economic legislation that (1) impedes
liberty interests central to personhood, (2) burdens politically unpopular
minority groups, or (3) benefits concentrated interest groups at the expense
of diffuse majorities.
AUTHOR—J.D. candidate, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 2018;
B.A., Oklahoma State University, 2012. For helpful comments and
conversation, thanks to Professors Steven G. Calabresi and Leonard S.
Rubinowitz, George F. Will, Jentry Lanza, Sheridan Caldwell, Connor
Madden, Patrick Sullivan, and Arielle W. Tolman. And thanks, as always,
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It is not to be forgotten that what we call rational grounds for our
beliefs are often extremely irrational attempts to justify our instincts.
—Thomas H. Huxley†

INTRODUCTION
Under the traditional model of rational basis review, courts defer to
the credibility of legislative records when reviewing the constitutionality of
laws touching on economic interests—a form of constitutional scrutiny this
Note refers to as “deferential” rational basis review. But should courts
occasionally view the credibility of such records with skepticism, rather
than deference? And if so, when? As precedent now stands, the factual
records underlying every type of economic legislation are subject only to
deferential rational basis review, from child labor measures to minimum
wage standards. Yet the liberty interests that these and other regulations
infringe, and the legislative motivations behind them, are often vastly
different.1 This Note argues that courts should view the factual records

†
THOMAS H. HUXLEY, ON THE NATURAL INEQUALITY OF MEN (1890), reprinted in METHODS AND
RESULTS: ESSAYS 309, 310 n.1 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1899).
1
Austin Raynor, Note, Economic Liberty and the Second-Order Rational Basis Test, 99 VA. L.
REV. 1065, 1066 (2013) (describing the Supreme Court’s “policy of deference to legislative judgments
on matters of economic import” as “trans-substantive” in that “[e]conomic regulations of every stripe
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underlying economic legislation skeptically when that legislation (1)
impedes liberty interests central to personhood, (2) burdens politically
unpopular minority groups, or (3) benefits concentrated interest groups at
the expense of diffuse majorities.
Supreme Court and circuit court case law suggest a breakdown of
deferential rational basis review of certain economic legislation. Since
2002, three federal courts of appeals have questioned the credibility of the
factual records underlying economic legislation before invalidating that
legislation under rational basis review.2 Given the Court’s decades-long
application of this alternative to deferential rational basis review to
noneconomic legislation—a form of constitutional scrutiny this Note refers
to as “credibility-questioning” rational basis review3—uses of it might
otherwise seem to border the unremarkable.4
Nevertheless, five courts of appeals are divided as to whether the
factual records underlying certain economic legislation, including
occupational licensing measures, ought to be treated skeptically under
rational basis review. Three courts of appeals have engaged in such
credibility-questioning rational basis review of economic legislation,5 while
two have disavowed it in favor of deferential rational basis review.6 That
split deepened when the Supreme Court recently denied a petition for a writ
of certiorari to review a Second Circuit case holding that economic
are subject to minimum rational basis scrutiny, regardless of the importance of the infringed liberty
interest or the legislative motivation underlying the particular statute”).
2
St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 223–24 (5th Cir. 2013); Merrifield v. Lockyer,
547 F.3d 978, 989–91 (9th Cir. 2008); Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 226–27 (6th Cir. 2002).
3
See Bertrall L. Ross II, The State as Witness: Windsor, Shelby County, and Judicial Distrust of
the Legislative Record, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2027, 2031–32 (2014) (coining the phrase “credibilityquestioning review” and describing how, under that form of review, “the Court questions whether the
state’s record can be believed as a complete and unbiased presentation of evidence related to the
constitutionality of the law”). Commentators and courts have also referred to this enhanced style of
review as “higher-order rational-basis review,” “rational basis with bite,” and “the second-order rational
basis test,” among other names. See, e.g., Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1223 n.21 (10th Cir. 2004)
(“higher-order rational-basis review”); Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite:
Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 780 (1987) (“rational basis with bite”);
Raynor, supra note 1, at 1065 (“second-order” rational basis review).
4
Despite at least eighteen applications of a skeptical form of rational basis review, see infra note
91, the Supreme Court has yet to demarcate such a form of review from traditional rational basis
review. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 459 n.4 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s rational basis analysis in Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S.
55 (1982), and U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), is generally “viewed as
intermediate review . . . masquerading in rational-basis language”).
5
See St. Joseph Abbey, 712 F.3d at 223; Merrifield, 547 F.3d at 991; Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 224–
25.
6
Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281, 284 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
1160 (2016); Powers, 379 F.3d at 1224–25.
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legislation is subject only to deferential rational basis review.7 The Court’s
denial leaves unresolved the question of whether all economic legislation is
subject only to deferential rational basis review or whether certain
economic legislation is subject to credibility-questioning rational basis
review.
This Note argues that a per se rule against the application of
credibility-questioning rational basis review to certain economic legislation
is inappropriate. The normative premises behind the Supreme Court’s
previous applications of credibility-questioning rational basis review
require such review when economic legislation implicates those premises.
These premises include a presumption against legislation that impedes
liberty interests central to personhood or that burdens politically unpopular
minority groups. Courts should thus apply credibility-questioning review to
economic legislation that does either. Furthermore, principles from other
sources—the “law of nations,” or ius gentium,8 and public choice theory—
support the application of credibility-questioning review to certain
economic legislation.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the constitutional
framework the Supreme Court historically used to evaluate economic
legislation. It then introduces the modern approach to rational basis review
of economic legislation and finally examines the emergence of credibilityquestioning rational basis review. Part II discusses the circuit split between
the courts of appeals for the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits
regarding whether economic legislation, including occupational licensing
measures, should be subject to deferential or credibility-questioning
rational basis review. Part II also briefly discusses a related split between
those courts of appeals as to whether pure economic protectionism is a
legitimate government interest.
Next, Part III argues that Supreme Court precedent requires courts to
treat the factual records underlying economic legislation skeptically under
rational basis review if such legislation either impedes liberty interests
central to personhood or burdens politically unpopular minority groups.
Part III further argues that the ius gentium and public choice theory support
a heightened review of the factual records underlying economic legislation
enacted solely to benefit concentrated interest groups at the expense of
diffuse majorities. Finally, Part III concludes by arguing that credibility7

Sensational Smiles, 136 S. Ct. 1160.
This Note’s use of the Latin phrase “ius gentium” refers to “the law of nations in the more
comprehensive sense—a body of law purporting to represent what various domestic legal systems share
in the way of common answers to common problems.” Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern
Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV. 129, 133 (2005).
8
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questioning review of such legislation need not entail a return to Lochner v.
New York9 or be used as a tool for judges to imprint their personal
judgments on the law.
I.   THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE SUPREME COURT’S
TREATMENT OF ECONOMIC LEGISLATION
The Supreme Court has charted two courses in its treatment of
economic legislation. In the first several decades of the twentieth century,
known as the Lochner era, the Court overturned a wide range of economic
legislation on substantive due process grounds. The Court then retreated
from the Lochner era by outlining a deferential model of judicial review
under which it would presume the constitutionality of economic regulations
so long as they were rational.
A.   The History and Development of Rational Basis Review
1.   Substantive Due Process and the Lochner Era
In the four decades between 1897 and 1937, the Supreme Court
employed a rigorous form of judicial review to strike down a wide range of
statutes that it found to have violated individuals’ freedom of contract.10
The Court first developed these arguments in several decisions in the
1890s,11 and the reasoning underlying these cases continued into the
twentieth century. In the 1905 case of Lochner v. New York, for example,
the Court held that a New York statute regulating the hours bakery
employees could work unduly interfered with their liberty of contract, a
right the Lochner Court found was inherent in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.12 The Lochner decision largely
encapsulated the Court’s review of economic legislation during this fortyyear period,13 in which the Court invalidated a wide range of state
economic regulations on substantive due process grounds.14

9

198 U.S. 45 (1905).
See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) (striking down a Louisiana statute on
liberty of contract grounds); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 642–53 (5th ed. 2015) (discussing economic substantive due process).
11
See David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of
Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 28 (2003).
12
198 U.S. at 53.
13
See Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional Tradition,
70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 21 (1991) (explaining that “despite the close vote in Lochner, Lochner era
constitutionalism was widely popular among jurists in late nineteenth and early twentieth century
America”).
14
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
10
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In Lochner, the Supreme Court emphasized that only a valid exercise
of a state’s police power could interfere with one’s freedom of contract.15
Because the challenged statute limited bakers to working ten hours a day
and sixty hours a week,16 the Court concluded that “[t]he statute necessarily
interfere[d] with the right of contract between the employer and
employés.”17 And because the statute had no relationship to public health—
“[c]lean and wholesome bread does not depend upon” the number of hours
bakers work—it was not a valid exercise of the state’s police power.18
Lochner thus established what has been called a “classic substantive
due process” regime: rather than using the Due Process Clause to ensure
that laws would correctly follow constitutional procedure, the Supreme
Court instead used the clause to ensure that laws have a satisfactory
purpose.19 The approach that Lochner established resulted in the striking
down of nearly 200 laws as unconstitutional violations of the Due Process
Clause.20 Over the next three decades, the Court would employ this
fundamental rights analysis in declaring unconstitutional laws protecting
unionizing,21 setting state minimum wages,22 regulating prices,23 and
regulating business entry,24 among others. However, a moribund economy
that led to a markedly different approach to governance would end the
Lochner era faster than it was created.25
2.   The Death of Lochner and the Emergence of Rational
Basis Review
Judicial chinks in the doctrine of Lochner first opened in the 1934
case of Nebbia v. New York, in which the Supreme Court upheld a statute

15

198 U.S. at 53.
Id. at 46 n.1.
17
Id. at 53.
18
Id. at 57.
19
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 644.
20
Id.
21
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174 (1908) (“[I]t is not within the functions of
government . . . to compel any person in the course of his business and against his will to accept or
retain the personal services of another.”).
22
Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 561–62 (1923) (finding that a minimum wage law
interfered with freedom of contract and did not serve a valid public purpose).
23
Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 355, 359 (1928) (overturning a law that set the maximum
price for employment agencies); Tyson & Brother–United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton,
273 U.S. 418, 431 (1927) (invalidating a law that placed a ceiling on the price of theater tickets because
it interfered with the freedom of contract).
24
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 278–79 (1932) (invalidating a law that prohibited
the sale of ice without a permit because it intentionally created a monopoly).
25
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 649.
16
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that set prices for milk.26 The statute in question was designed to protect the
purchasing power of milk producers by establishing a state milk control
board.27 In what has been recognized as the ushering in of a different
standard to economic regulation,28 the Court announced that “[p]rice
control, like any other form of regulation, is unconstitutional only if
arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the
legislature is free to adopt, and hence an unnecessary and unwarranted
interference with individual liberty.”29 By couching its opinion in such
broad language, the Nebbia Court questioned the Lochner era principle of
aggressively reviewing regulations’ alleged purposes as valid exercises of a
state’s police power.30 But what began in Nebbia as little more than a
whisper would in three years turn into a shout.
The Supreme Court abandoned a fundamental rights style of analysis
in 1937,31 when it upheld as a reasonable exercise of the police power
legislation setting minimum wages for female employees.32 In West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, the Court explicitly rejected freedom of contract as a
substantive due process right and instead held that the government could
regulate economic activity for a legitimate purpose.33 The Court also
explained that courts were to defer to the choices of legislatures so long as
those choices were reasonable.34
Having introduced a new policy of judicial deference to economic
legislation by abandoning its fundamental rights analysis, the Supreme
Court, in the 1938 case of United States v. Carolene Products Co.,35 then
established the now-familiar levels of scrutiny used to analyze legislation
26

291 U.S. 502, 519–20, 539 (1934).
Id. at 518.
28
See, e.g., David N. Mayer, The Myth of “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism”: Liberty of Contract
During the Lochner Era, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 217, 278 (2009) (describing the new standard as
one “that seemed to turn on its head the general presumption in favor of liberty”).
29
Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 539.
30
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 650.
31
See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1, 11 (2003)
(explaining that West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 397 (1937), is “widely seen as signaling the
end of the Lochner era”). But see Alan J. Meese, Will, Judgment, and Economic Liberty: Mr. Justice
Souter and the Mistranslation of the Due Process Clause, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 3, 56 (1999)
(arguing that West Coast Hotel “did not . . . overrule Lochner or any liberty of occupation case not
involving an attempt to require [employers to pay their employees] a subsistence wage”).
32
W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (“What is this freedom [of contract]?
The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the
deprivation of liberty without due process of law . . . . [R]egulation which is reasonable in relation to its
subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process.”).
33
Id. at 392–93.
34
See id at 393.
35
304 U.S. 144 (1938).
27
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under the Fourteenth Amendment.36 In Carolene Products, the Court
reaffirmed its holding in West Coast Hotel and articulated a dual standard
of review that marked a doctrinal revolution.37 In its famous Footnote Four,
the Court outlined a bifurcated model of review characterized by strict
scrutiny on the one hand and rational basis review on the other.38 While the
Court would generally presume the constitutionality of laws so long as they
were rational, “a more searching judicial inquiry” would replace such
deference in two circumstances39: when a law violated individual rights
within the Constitution40 or discriminated against a “discrete and insular
minorit[y].”41 And while the Court explained that the rationality threshold
was low,42 it further lowered it in the years to come.
3.   Modern Rational Basis Review
Unlike strict or immediate scrutiny, in which courts actively assess the
credibility of the factual record underlying the challenged statute,43 the
hallmark of rational basis review is the absence of skeptical treatment of
the record. Under rational basis review, a plaintiff can win by showing one
of two things. First, the plaintiff can show the statute does not further a
legitimate government interest.44 Second, the plaintiff can demonstrate that
the government’s legitimate interest—its end—is unconnected to its
36

See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 652.
See Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE
L.J. 1287, 1289–90 (1982) (describing how “[t]he terms of the modern debates on judicial activism were
thus spawned” by Carolene Products, in which “[t]he Court committed itself to the now familiar
dichotomy between the scope of review for economic legislation—a nearly absolute majoritarianism—
and that afforded legislation affecting a vague and dimly perceived set of other ‘personal’ rights”); see
also Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 758 (2011) (explaining that
Carolene Products is “[v]iewed by many as the fountainhead of the heightened scrutiny framework”).
But see Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 656 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[Footnote Four]
did not refer to ‘searching judicial inquiry’ when a classification is based on alienage, perhaps because
there was a long line of authority holding such classifications entirely consonant with the Fourteenth
Amendment.”); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90–91 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing that
Carolene Products “did not purport to announce any new doctrine”).
38
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 496 (2004) (“Carolene
Products Co. pronounced . . . that certain forms of governmental discrimination warrant closer review
than others . . . .”); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J.
3094, 3128 (2015) (stating that Carolene Products signaled “the initial development of the two-tiered
structure of review”).
39
304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
See id. at 154 (noting that the threshold simply requires “any state of facts either known or which
could reasonably be assumed” (emphasis added)).
43
See LEE J. STRANG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 221 (6th ed.
2013).
44
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 709.
37
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means.45 Nevertheless, because under deferential rational basis review
courts largely defer to the underlying record, making either showing is
virtually impossible.
Since the emergence of the deferential rational basis standard,
plaintiffs have consistently failed to demonstrate that the challenged statute
does not further a legitimate government interest.46 This is largely because
plaintiffs are required to “negative every conceivable basis which might
support” the challenged statute.47 By definition, then, deferential rational
basis review does not require an assessment of the underlying record, and
courts do not treat the government’s evidence skeptically.48 Because of this,
courts have repeatedly followed the Supreme Court’s lead in upholding
challenged statutes on the basis of any number of imagined legitimate
interests behind the statute.49
Plaintiffs have also consistently failed to demonstrate an
unconstitutional disconnect between the means and ends of the challenged
statute. As Professor Bertrall Ross has noted, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly found a sufficient connection between the means and ends of
both under- and overinclusive statutes.50 The Court has given both the state
and federal governments significant leeway in pursuing incremental reform
for underinclusive statutes that target fewer amounts of individuals than

45

See id. at 714.
See, e.g., Robert C. Farrell, The Two Versions of Rational-Basis Review and Same-Sex
Relationships, 86 WASH. L. REV. 281, 288 (2011) (describing the inquiry into the legitimacy of a state’s
interest as “amount[ing] to virtually no review at all,” because “[e]ven the most egregiously unfair laws
could survive this kind of scrutiny”); Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (referring to
rational basis review as “minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact”).
47
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973) (citation omitted).
48
See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1993) (explaining that statutes which feature “a
classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines” are given “a
strong presumption of validity,” because states have “no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the
[statute’s] rationality”).
49
See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (explaining that courts must
uphold a challenged statute “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis” for it); see also, e.g., Locke v. Shore, 682 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1290 (N.D. Fla. 2010)
(upholding a Florida law banning the unlicensed practice of interior design on the grounds that the law
“protect[ed] consumers from incompetent or poorly trained interior designers”); Meadows v. Odom,
360 F. Supp. 2d 811, 824 (M.D. La. 2005), vacated as moot, 198 F. App’x 348 (5th Cir. 2006)
(upholding a Louisiana florist-licensing scheme on the grounds that broken wires, exposed picks, and
infected flowers could “cause injury to a consumer”).
50
Ross, supra note 3, at 2064–65; see also, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc.,
348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (“The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there,
neglecting the others.”).
46
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would otherwise be constitutionally required.51 Moreover, the Court has
done the same for overinclusive statutes that target greater amounts of
individuals than would otherwise be constitutionally required.52 The
takeaway is that in nearly every instance that the Court purportedly checks
the means–end fit of a challenged statute under deferential rational basis
review, it fails to question the government’s motives by treating the
underlying record skeptically.53
Modern constitutional law’s doctrinal framework of subjecting
economic legislation to a negligible level of judicial review—a level this
Note argues is at odds with the judiciary’s responsibility to protect liberty
interests central to personhood, politically unpopular minority groups, and
diffuse majorities—is perhaps best characterized by the Supreme Court’s
treatment of an occupational licensing measure twenty years after Carolene
Products. In the 1955 case of Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.,
the Court deferentially reviewed the underlying record in upholding an
Oklahoma statute that required a prescription from an ophthalmologist or
optometrist to fit eyeglass lenses into frames.54 The Court deferred to the
record while ignoring evidence that the law was likely enacted at the behest
of ophthalmologists and optometrists.55
The Lee Optical Court underscored this deference by providing a wide
range of post hoc rationales as to why the Oklahoma legislature may have
enacted the statute.56 In doing so, it explained that “[t]he day is gone when
this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions,
because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a
51

See, e.g., Heller, 509 U.S. at 321 (“A classification does not fail rational-basis review because it
is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
52
See Ross, supra note 3, at 2065 n.175.
53
Cf. Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971
Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 357 (1999) (noting that from 1971 to 1996, the
Supreme Court decided ten “successful rational basis claims under the Equal Protection Clause” while
“reject[ing] rational basis arguments on one hundred occasions”).
54
348 U.S. at 488.
55
Indeed, the district court noted that the statute “serve[d] to prohibit the wearers of eyeglasses
from exchanging their frames either to obtain more modern designs or because the former frames are
broken, without first visiting an ophthalmologist or optometrist; and, which in turn divert[ed] from the
optician a very substantial, as well as profitable, part of his business.” Lee Optical of Okla., Inc. v.
Williamson, 120 F. Supp. 128, 135 (W.D. Okla. 1954), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
56
348 U.S. at 487 (“The legislature might have concluded that the frequency of occasions when a
prescription is necessary was sufficient to justify this regulation of the fitting of eyeglasses . . . . But the
legislature might have concluded that one was needed often enough to require one in every case. Or the
legislature may have concluded that eye examinations were so critical . . . that every change in frames
and every duplication of a lens should be accompanied by a prescription from a medical expert.”).
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particular school of thought.”57 Because of this, the Supreme Court strongly
suggested that economic legislation would be found unconstitutional only if
a government attorney or Justice could not think of any conceivable
rationale as to why the legislature passed it.58
That the rationale the Supreme Court offered in Lee Optical strained
credulity was not lost on early observers, both in the academy and in the
judiciary. On the academic side, the literature following Lee Optical tended
to agree that the case was “[p]erhaps the best illustration[] of the extent to
which the Court will go to uphold statutes attacked as unreasonable.”59 On
the judicial side, courts were more than willing to engage in such acts of
legal fiction. Take, for example, the South Carolina Supreme Court, which
referenced the mythological Pierian Spring of Macedonia in providing its
own post hoc rationale behind a naturopath licensing scheme.60
But decisions of both the Supreme Court and several courts of appeals
have strained this rigid, if not fanciful, approach to judicial review.61 While
Lee Optical is but one of numerous examples of this tiered approach, “it
[is] a fact,” as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted at an oral argument in
2016, “that in the decisions of this Court, those tiers are not what they once
were.”62

57

Id. at 488.
See id. at 487–88 (“[T]he law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be
constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that
the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”).
59
Note, Supreme Court Review of State Findings of Fact in Fourteenth Amendment Cases,
14 STAN. L. REV. 328, 335 & n.34 (1962); see also Guy Miller Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative
Principle and Economic Due Process, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1463, 1471 & n.36 (1966) (criticizing the
Court’s review in Lee Optical as “effectively irrebuttable,” given how it “interpreted literally” Carolene
Products’s command that legislation should be assumed to “rest[] upon some rational basis within the
knowledge and experience of the legislators” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Note, Racial
Discrimination in Housing, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 532 (1959) (describing how the Court in Lee
Optical “indulge[d] in the presumption of the legislature’s having determined some rational factual
distinction which is not suggested by the statute itself or by common knowledge”).
60
Dantzler v. Callison, 94 S.E.2d 177, 187 (S.C. 1956) (explaining that the legislature, “[f]or good
and sufficient reasons . . . may have concluded that ‘a little learning is a dangerous thing’ and that those
who would undertake to treat or manipulate the human body must ‘drink deep or touch not,’” which
referenced, without citation to, Alexander Pope’s description of the Pieran Spring of Macedonia—
known in Greek mythology as a source of knowledge—in lines 217 and 218 of his poem, “An Essay on
Criticism”). But see Gen. Motors Corp. v. Blevins, 144 F. Supp. 381, 398 (D. Colo. 1956) (stating that,
notwithstanding Lee Optical’s deferential standard of review, “a state may not, under the guise of
protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business by the use of unusual and
unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations”).
61
See infra Sections I.B, II.A–D.
62
Transcript of Oral Argument at 12–13, Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017) (No.
15-606).
58
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B.   A More Searching Inquiry: Credibility-Questioning Rational
Basis Review
While the Supreme Court has not officially recognized credibilityquestioning rational basis review,63 a large body of literature has steadily
developed over the past four decades suggesting that it has all but done so.64
The idea is that the Court, in evaluating the constitutionality of a statute
under the rational basis test, sometimes gives a more demanding inquiry
into whether the government’s interest is legitimate and into whether the
challenged statute’s means appropriately fit its ends.65 When the Court
utilizes this approach, it goes beyond mere speculation regarding the
government’s supposed interest and looks for evidence in the underlying
record that demonstrates the government’s motive. When reviewing the
record, the Court becomes skeptical of post hoc rationales and does not shy
away from marking the outer boundaries of the federal government’s
interests or the states’ police power.
Three Supreme Court cases—Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,66
Lawrence v. Texas,67 and United States v. Windsor68—continued to fill in
the details of the Court’s portrait of credibility-questioning rational basis
review that it first began to sketch decades ago.69 Each case represents a
63

Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1223–24 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Despite the hue and cry from all
sides, no majority of the Court has stated that the rational-basis review found in Cleburne and Romer v.
Evans . . . differs from the traditional variety . . . .”).
64
See, e.g., Robert W. Bennett, “Mere” Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and
Democratic Theory, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1049, 1055 n.35 (1979) (discussing a line of cases in which the
Court applied a heightened standard of review to find legislation unconstitutional); Ashutosh Bhagwat,
Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 297, 312–16 (1997) (same); R. Randall
Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and Related Constitutional Doctrines
Protecting Individual Rights: The “Base Plus Six” Model and Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 225, 225–26 (2002) (arguing that the Court applies not just four standards of review—
strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, heightened rational basis review, and rational basis review—but
seven).
65
See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The
[equal protection] model’s two fixed modes of analysis, strict scrutiny and mere rationality, simply do
not describe the inquiry the Court has undertaken—or should undertake—in equal protection cases.
Rather, the inquiry has been much more sophisticated and the Court should admit as much.”).
66
413 U.S. 528 (1973).
67
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
68
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
69
Commentators generally agree that the Supreme Court’s modern use of credibility-questioning
rational basis review began in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 46, at 32
(explaining that Reed “provide[s] some evidence that the Court is ready to employ a vitalized old equal
protection more broadly” and represents a step “into less accustomed terrain”). In Reed, the Court
struck down as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment an Idaho
statute that gave preference to men over women as administrators of estates. 404 U.S. at 76–77. It did
so despite an otherwise rational basis for the law: “reducing the workload on probate courts by
eliminating one class of contests.” Id. at 76.
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departure from the Court’s traditional approach to the review of legislation,
whereby legislation would either survive all but the most significant
constitutional challenges under rational basis review or be struck down by
less robust challenges under strict scrutiny.
First, in 1973, the Supreme Court expanded its skepticism of
regulations burdening minority groups that it first espoused in Carolene
Products by striking down a provision of the Food Stamp Act in
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno.70 That provision excluded
households containing individuals unrelated to other household members
from acquiring food stamps.71 In holding the challenged provision of the
Act unconstitutional, the Court implemented the two primary features of
credibility-questioning review: ignoring post hoc rationales that would
otherwise legitimate a government interest72 and scrutinizing the fit
between the challenged statute’s means and ends.73
The Moreno Court first examined the underlying record, which
explained that the provision “was intended to prevent so-called ‘hippies’
and ‘hippie communes’ from participating in the food stamp program.”74 In
evaluating this portion of the record, the Court ignored the government’s
proffered rationale of the statute, which was to prevent fraud.75 The Court
then held that the means–end fit of the Food Stamp Act was
unconstitutionally attenuated.76 It noted that the means of the Act excluded
those “who are so desperately in need of aid that they cannot even afford to
alter their living arrangements so as to retain their eligibility.”77 According
to the Court, this overinclusiveness could not pass constitutional muster.78
Next, in 2003, the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas struck down
as a violation of due process a Texas law that prohibited same-sex
sodomy.79 Because the Court did not recognize same-sex sodomy as a
fundamental right, strict scrutiny was not applicable.80 Instead, the Court
employed what has been widely acknowledged as a heightened standard of
review more similar to credibility-questioning than deferential rational
70

413 U.S. at 538.
Id. at 529.
72
Id. at 534–35.
73
Id. at 536–38.
74
Id. at 534. The Court was quoting a statement made by Senator Spessard Holland, as reflected in
the Act’s Conference Report. 116 CONG. REC. 44,439 (1970).
75
Moreno, 413 U.S. at 535–36.
76
Id. at 536–38.
77
Id. at 538.
78
Id.
79
539 U.S. 558, 562, 578–79 (2003).
80
Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
71
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basis review.81 As in Moreno, the Court ignored several of the rationales the
state offered to justify its interest in passing the law.82 While the state
argued that the legislature passed the law due to its legitimate interest in
avoiding litigation, promoting morality, and protecting the family,83 the
Court found none of these motives constitutionally sufficient.84 In addition,
the Court rejected at least five other post hoc rationales, explaining that the
case did not “involve minors,” “public conduct or prostitution,” or other
purported interests offered to justify the law’s purpose.85
Finally, in 2013, the Supreme Court in United States v. Windsor
followed the credibility-questioning approach it took in Moreno and
Lawrence in explaining that it would carefully consider, by examining the
record, whether the interest behind the challenged law was legitimate.86 In
Windsor, the Court invalidated the Defense of Marriage Act’s (DOMA)
definition of marriage as “a legal union between one man and one woman
as husband and wife.”87 As Justice Antonin Scalia noted in dissent, the
majority did not apply a fundamental rights analysis and thus strict scrutiny
did not guide its decision.88 Nevertheless, the Court paid particular attention
to the DOMA House Report, a portion of which stated that “it is both
appropriate and necessary for Congress to do what it can to defend the
institution of traditional heterosexual marriage.”89 The Court also
highlighted two other portions of the Report: first, a statement that labeled
a same-sex conception of marriage as “a truly radical proposal that would
fundamentally alter the institution of marriage”; and second, a statement
describing DOMA as a “moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral
conviction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional (especially
Judeo-Christian) morality.”90
81

See, e.g., Michael A. Scaperlanda, Illusions of Liberty and Equality: An “Alien’s” View of
Tiered Scrutiny, Ad Hoc Balancing, Governmental Power, and Judicial Imperialism, 55 CATHOLIC U.
L. REV. 5, 6 (2005) (explaining that the Lawrence Court’s rational basis review typified a “new regime
of ad hoc or sliding scale balancing”); Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite:
Why the Supreme Court Should Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications
Based on Sexual Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2770 (2005) (explaining that the Lawrence
Court’s use of rational basis review was “a type of heightened scrutiny”).
82
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
83
Brief of Respondent at 41–48, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102).
84
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
85
Id.
86
133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013).
87
Id. at 2683 (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012)).
88
Id. at 2706–07 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The majority never utters the dread words ‘substantive
due process,’ perhaps sensing the disrepute into which that doctrine has fallen, but that is what those
statements mean.”).
89
Id. at 2693 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 12 (1996)).
90
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 12, 16).
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These three cases illustrate how the Supreme Court occasionally
colors its rational basis review of a challenged statute with the statute’s
underlying motivation and ignores the varying rationales and interests the
government provides as justifications for the statute at issue.91 In such
circumstances, evidence of legislative intent to prejudice the class of
regulated persons need only be circumstantial, rather than conclusive.92
Several of the Justices’ concurring opinions have expressly acknowledged
that the Court sometimes applies credibility-questioning rational basis
review.93 The critical question, then: when does, and when should, the
“sometimes” occur?94 Five federal courts of appeals are divided on that
question.
II.   A CIRCUIT SPLIT ENDURES
The Supreme Court has opaquely used credibility-questioning rational
basis review since at least 1971,95 a type of review this Note argues should
apply to economic legislation that (1) impedes liberty interests central to
personhood, (2) burdens politically unpopular minority groups, or (3)
benefits concentrated interest groups at the expense of diffuse majorities.
But given the Court’s failure to precisely contour the boundaries of
credibility-questioning rational basis review, inconsistency over its
application has plagued the federal courts of appeals for decades. This
inconsistency is captured by a current circuit split regarding two closely
related issues: first, whether statutes infringing on economic liberty should
91

See Raynor, supra note 1, at 1080.
See id. at 1083.
93
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“When a law
exhibits such a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have applied a more searching form of
rational basis review.”); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 458 (1985) (Marshall,
J., concurring) (“[T]he rational-basis test invoked today is most assuredly not the rational-basis test of
[prior cases] and their progeny.”).
94
See Clark Neily, No Such Thing: Litigating Under the Rational Basis Test, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 898, 911, 912 n.75 (2005) (citing four cases “in which the Supreme Court has arguably strayed
from the literal commands of the rational basis test”). Add to the list an additional fourteen cases. See
Raphael Holoszyc-Pimentel, Reconciling Rational-Basis Review: When Does Rational Basis Bite?,
90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2076 (identifying the following eighteen cases in which the Court treated the
record skeptically: United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95 (1989); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cty. Comm’n,
488 U.S. 336 (1989); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Hooper v.
Bernalillo Cty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985); Metro. Life
Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S.
55 (1982); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528 (1973); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972);
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)).
95
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
92
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be subjected to credibility-questioning rational basis review; and second,
whether pure economic protectionism is a legitimate government interest.
Courts of appeals have diverged widely on these two issues, producing
many close decisions, concurrences, and dissents.96 Further complicating
the circuit split is the Supreme Court’s 2016 denial of a petition for a writ
of certiorari to review Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, a Second Circuit
case holding that economic legislation is not subject to credibilityquestioning rational basis review and that pure economic protectionism is a
legitimate government interest.97
Of the five courts of appeals that have considered which form of
rational basis review courts should apply to economic legislation, only the
Sixth Circuit has affirmatively supported credibility-questioning review.98
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit, while purportedly relying on deferential
rational basis review to invalidate economic legislation, has strayed more
closely to credibility-questioning review than it has led on.99 The Fifth
Circuit has employed similar reasoning—deferential rational basis review
in name only.100 The Tenth and Second Circuits, however, have expressly
disavowed credibility-questioning review.101
The issue of whether pure economic protectionism is a legitimate
government interest is also the subject of a circuit split, though narrower.
Aside from the Second Circuit, only the Tenth Circuit has concluded that
pure economic protectionism is a legitimate government interest. The Fifth,
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have found the opposite. The scorecard on these
issues currently stands as follows:
96

See Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2015); St. Joseph Abbey v.
Castille, 712 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2013); Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2008); Powers v.
Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004); Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).
97
See Sensational Smiles, 793 F.3d 281 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 136 S. Ct. 1160 (2016).
98
See Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 228–29 (“None of the justifications offered by the state satisfies the
slight review required by rational basis review under the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment. As this court has said, ‘rational basis review, while deferential, is not
toothless.’” (citation omitted)).
99
See Merrifield, 547 F.3d at 991 (explaining that the “singling out” of one class of producer “in
connection with a rationale so weak that it undercuts the principle of non-contradiction, fails to meet the
relatively easy standard of rational basis review . . . . Needless to say, while a government need not
provide a perfectly logically solution to regulatory problems, it cannot hope to survive rational basis
review by resorting to irrationality.” (emphasis omitted)).
100
See St. Joseph Abbey, 712 F.3d at 226. (“The great deference due state economic regulation
does not demand judicial blindness to the history of a challenged rule or the context of its adoption nor
does it require courts to accept nonsensical explanations for regulation.”).
101
See Sensational Smiles, 793 F.3d at 285 (“[I]t is not the role of the courts to second-guess the
wisdom or logic of the State’s decision to credit one form of disputed evidence over another.”); Powers,
379 F.3d at 1221 (declining to skeptically review the record of a licensing statute and stating that a
“mere[] . . . citation to [Lee Optical] would have sufficed to dispose” of the case).
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Court of Appeals

Should statutes that
limit occupational
freedom be subject to
credibility-questioning
rational basis review?

Is pure economic
protectionism a legitimate
government interest?

Sixth Circuit:
Craigmiles v. Giles
(2002)

Yes

No

Ninth Circuit: Merrifield
v. Lockyer (2008)

Maybe

No

Fifth Circuit: St. Joseph
Abbey v. Castille (2013)

Maybe

No

Tenth Circuit: Powers v.
Harris (2004)

No

Yes

Second Circuit:
Sensational Smiles, LLC
v. Mullen (2015)

No

Yes

A.   The Sixth Circuit: Craigmiles v. Giles
The strongest use of credibility-questioning rational basis review of
economic legislation in the federal courts of appeals came in Craigmiles v.
Giles, in which the Sixth Circuit held that a licensing statute violated the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses because it served no other
purpose than to impose an entry barrier to market competition.102 That
statute, the Tennessee Funeral Directors and Embalmers Act (FDEA),
forbade non-state-licensed funeral directors from selling funeral
merchandise.103 The plaintiffs, who sold caskets but did not engage in any
funeral services,104 successfully sought an injunction against the FDEA’s
enforcement in the district court.105

102

312 F.3d at 228–29.
See id. at 222. The FDEA’s requirements for obtaining a license were onerous, requiring either
a two-year apprenticeship or the completion of one year of academic study at an accredited mortuary
school and a one-year apprenticeship with a licensed funeral director. See id.
104
Id. at 222–23.
105
The district court issued an injunction on the grounds that no health or safety reason—the
ostensible purpose of the FDEA—was rationally related to the FDEA’s licensing requirements. See
Craigmiles v. Giles, 110 F. Supp. 2d 658, 665, 667 (E.D. Tenn. 2000), aff’d, Craigmiles, 312 F.3d 220.
103
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The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision after reciting
the traditional requirements of deferential rational basis review.106 But in
doing so, it aggressively scrutinized the underlying record and the
rationales that the state offered in support of the FDEA.107 After surveying
the legislative history of the FDEA, the court held that the legislature’s
rationales—public health and safety and consumer protection—“come
close to striking us with the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead
fish.”108 This was the case, the court stated, because the FDEA licensing
requirements were a plain attempt to prevent competition.109Acknowledging
that while “only a handful of provisions have been invalidated for failing
rational basis review,” the court expressly stated that the case before it
should be among that handful.110 In two important respects, the court
departed from deferential rational basis review: the court (1) heavily
focused on the motivation of the state legislature as evidence of the state’s
interest and (2) conducted a means–end analysis by examining the fit
between the FDEA and its ostensible purpose.111 It thus engaged in the two
primary features of credibility-questioning rational basis review.112
Having found no rational relationship between the FDEA and the
state’s proffered interests, the court was left to consider the legitimacy of
the FDEA’s plain purpose of economic protectionism.113 While the court
did not engage in a detailed analysis of what renders economic
protectionism “obvious[ly] illegitimate,”114 it suggested that its illegitimacy
derives from a state’s attempt to protect monopoly rents that stateprivileged businesses can extract from consumers.115 In addition, the court
explained that protectionist measures such as the FDEA are illegitimate
because they “harm[] consumers in their pocketbooks” by protecting
businesses from competition.116
106

Under such review, statutes are entitled to a “strong presumption of validity,” Craigmiles,
312 F.3d at 224, and will survive challenges if they bear “some rational relation to a legitimate state
interest,” id. at 223 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996)).
107
See id. at 225–28.
108
Id. at 225 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
109
Id.
110
Id. Significantly, the court cited both Romer v. Evans and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, two prominent credibility-questioning rational basis cases, for support. Id.
111
See id. at 227 (“The Supreme Court, employing rational basis review, has been suspicious of a
legislature’s circuitous path to legitimate ends when a direct path is available.” (citing City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985))).
112
See supra notes 69–70.
113
Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 228.
114
Id.
115
See id.
116
Id.
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B.   The Ninth Circuit: Merrifield v. Lockyer
In Merrifield v. Lockyer, the Ninth Circuit purportedly relied on
deferential rational basis review to strike down a California law that
required nonpesticide pest control operators to obtain licenses through a
two-year process.117 However, like the Sixth Circuit in Craigmiles, its
analysis resembled the application of credibility-questioning rational basis
review.
While the court approvingly quoted Lee Optical and other deferential
rational basis review cases, it nevertheless engaged in credibilityquestioning review by examining the statute’s underlying record, the state’s
supposed interest, and whether the statute’s means fit its supposed end.118
The record demonstrated that the challenged law was amended to exempt
from the licensing requirement certain pest control operators but not others,
including the plaintiff,119 which led California’s Structural Pest Control
Board to order the plaintiff to cease and desist his pest control operation.120
The court explained that while the licensing law was connected to the
state’s interest in public health and safety, it “was designed to favor
economically certain constituents at the expense of others similarly
situated, such as [the plaintiff].”121 Moreover, the court expressly
questioned the record’s credibility by noting that the exemption at issue
was protectionist in nature.122 According to the Ninth Circuit, the law
violated the Equal Protection Clause; it noted without further explanation
that “economic protectionism for its own sake, regardless of its relation to
the common good, cannot be said to be in furtherance of a legitimate
governmental interest.”123 So the court, while professing to rely on the
deferential rational basis review à la Lee Optical, employed credibilityquestioning review to strike down a purely protectionist licensing measure.
C.   The Fifth Circuit: St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille
Similar to Merrifield, the Fifth Circuit in St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille
did not expressly rely on credibility-questioning review but nevertheless
117

547 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2008).
See id. at 988.
119
Specifically, the amendment exempted operators “engaged in the live capture and removal or
exclusion of vertebrate pests,” defining vertebrates narrowly to include “bats, raccoons, skunks, and
squirrels,” but not “mice, rats, or pigeons.” Id. at 981–82.
120
Id. at 981.
121
Id. at 991.
122
The court noted that “the record highlights that the irrational singling out of three types of
vertebrate pests from all other vertebrate animals was designed to favor economically certain
constituents at the expense of others similarly situated, such as Merrifield.” Id.
123
Id. at 992 n.15.
118
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struck down a Louisiana licensing measure by examining the state’s
supposed interest and whether the measure’s means fit its end.124 Like the
licensing regulation in Craigmiles,125 the Louisiana regulation forbade
unlicensed funeral directors from selling caskets.126 The plaintiffs,
Benedictine monks, had invested $200,000 into their casket-selling
business to support their abbey.127 However, shortly before their business
was to open, the Louisiana Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors
ordered the monks to cease and desist their casket operation,128 an action
the district court found unconstitutional.129
The Fifth Circuit openly questioned the credibility of the underlying
record. The court justified its skeptical approach by explaining that “[t]he
great deference due state economic regulation does not demand judicial
blindness to the history of a challenged rule or the context of its adoption
nor does it require courts to accept nonsensical explanations for
regulation.”130 It thus agreed with the Craigmiles court that “neither
precedent nor broader principles suggest that mere economic protection of
a particular industry is a legitimate governmental purpose.”131 Despite the
fact that, pursuant to Lee Optical, “economic protection, that is favoritism,
may well be supported by a post hoc perceived rationale,”132 the court
engaged in a more rigorous inquiry into the state’s rationales that could
warrant the licensing regulation.133 Finding no rational basis for the casketlicensing regulation, the court affirmed the district court’s holding that the
regulation denied the monks equal protection and due process of law.134
D.   The Tenth Circuit: Powers v. Harris
Unlike the Sixth, Ninth, and Fifth Circuits, the Tenth Circuit in
Powers v. Harris did not engage in credibility-questioning rational basis
review when it upheld an Oklahoma licensing regulation.135 Similar to the

124

St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 226–27 (5th Cir. 2013).
See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text.
126
St. Joseph Abbey, 712 F.3d at 217–18.
127
Id. at 217.
128
St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 835 F. Supp. 2d 149, 154 (E.D. La. 2011), aff’d 712 F.3d 215 (5th
Cir. 2013).
129
Id. at 160.
130
St. Joseph Abbey, 712 F.3d at 226.
131
Id. at 222.
132
Id. at 222–23.
133
See id. at 223–26.
134
Id. at 227.
135
See 379 F.3d 1208, 1225 (10th Cir. 2004).
125

506

112:487 (2017)

Rationalizing Rational Basis Review

licensing regulations in Craigmiles and St. Joseph Abbey,136 the Oklahoma
regulation provided that only licensed funeral directors could sell funeral
merchandise, including caskets.137 The plaintiffs sought to sell their caskets
over the internet and asserted on appeal that because the licensing
regulation’s sole purpose was to prevent them and other would-be casket
sellers from entering the funeral-merchandise market, it did not serve a
legitimate government interest.138
The court declined to treat the underlying record skeptically,
explaining that its role was not to question the motives of the legislature
and that “no majority of the [Supreme] Court” has expressly recognized
nondeferential rational basis review.139 Deferring to the record, the court
noted that if pure economic protectionism was a legitimate state interest,
then the regulation would satisfy rational basis review because its various
requirements were related to such an interest.140 And because, in its view,
the Supreme Court has held that “favoring one particular intrastate
industry, absent a specific federal constitutional or statutory violation, is a
legitimate state interest,” so too was pure economic protectionism.141
Having concluded that such protectionism was a legitimate state interest,
the court held that the licensing measure did not fail rational basis
review.142
E.   The Second Circuit: Sensational Smiles v. Mullen
Given the existing split, the Second Circuit in 2015 had an opportunity
to either render the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in Powers v. Harris an outlier
or join it, thereby further muddling the picture. In Sensational Smiles, the
136

See supra notes 102–103, 121 and accompanying text.
Powers, 379 F.3d at 1211. To obtain a funeral director’s license, the regulation required an
applicant to complete sixty hours of undergraduate coursework and a one-year apprenticeship. Id. at
1212. Moreover, the regulation required licensees’ businesses to “have a fixed physical location, a
preparation room that meets the requirements for embalming bodies, a funeral-service merchandiseselection room with an inventory of not less than five caskets, and adequate areas for public viewing of
human remains.” Id. at 1212–13.
138
Id. at 1213, 1215–16.
139
Id. at 1223–24.
140
See id. at 1222.
141
Id. at 1220. Chief Judge Timothy Tymkovich’s concurrence took a nondeferential approach to
arrive at the same conclusion. He noted that that the four Supreme Court decisions the majority relied
on rested on a foundation that was missing in the regulation at issue: “the discriminatory legislation
arguably advance[d] either the general welfare or a public interest.” Id. at 1225 (Tymkovich, C.J.,
concurring). He noted that even in Lee Optical, the Court rested its holding on consumer protection and
health-related interests. Id. at 1225–26. Consequently, he stated that no Supreme Court case “holds that
the bare preference of one economic actor while furthering no greater public interest advances a
‘legitimate state interest.’” Id. at 1226.
142
Id. at 1211 (majority opinion).
137
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Second Circuit chose the latter, holding that economic legislation is subject
only to deferential rational basis review and that pure economic
protectionism is a legitimate state interest.143 Given the Supreme Court’s
denial of certiorari to review the case,144 its holding remains law and the
circuit split has deepened.
The regulation at issue in Sensational Smiles was a declaratory ruling
issued by Connecticut’s State Dental Commission establishing that only
licensed dentists could provide certain teeth-whitening procedures,
including pointing a light-emitting diode (LED) at someone’s teeth.145 After
receiving a cease-and-desist letter from the Connecticut State Department
of Health, the plaintiffs, who operated a nondentist teeth-whitening
business, sought injunctive relief.146 The plaintiffs asserted that the
declaratory ruling was not rationally related to the state’s proffered public
safety rationale, pointing to the undisputed evidence in the record
demonstrating that using LED lights for teeth whitening was harmless.147
The district court disagreed.148
Like the district court, the Second Circuit upheld the constitutionality
of the declaratory ruling under deferential rational basis review.149 The
court expressly declined the plaintiffs’ invitation to review the underlying
record critically by focusing on the State Dental Commission’s motivation
as evidence of the state’s interest.150 The court also deferred to the record
when it examined the fit between the declaratory ruling’s means and its
supposed end.151 The court offered several post hoc rationales, including the
hypothetical conclusion on behalf of the dental commission that customers
seeking to use LED lights for teeth-whitening purposes “should first
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793 F.3d 281, 284, 286 (2d Cir. 2015).
Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 136 S. Ct. 1160 (2016).
145
Martinez v. Mullen, 11 F. Supp. 3d 149, 153–54 (D. Conn. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Sensational
Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1160 (2016).
146
Sensational Smiles, 793 F.3d at 283–84.
147
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 1–2,
Martinez v. Mullen, 11 F. Supp. 3d 149 (D. Conn. 2014) (No. 3:11-CV-01787-MPS) (“[L]iterally
millions of people worldwide have had their teeth whitened in this manner without a single reported
incident of significant or permanent harm.”).
148
Martinez, 11 F. Supp. 3d at 160, 169. In reviewing the plaintiff’s claim, the district court noted
the possibility of applying credibility-questioning rational basis review but opted to apply the
deferential version instead. Id. at 160 (quoting Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 180 (2d Cir.
2012)). Indeed, the court noted that rational basis review’s “teeth are dull and [its] bite rare.” Id.
149
Sensational Smiles, 793 F.3d at 283.
150
Id. at 286.
151
See id. at 284 (“[W]e are required to uphold the classification ‘if there is any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.’” (quoting Heller v.
Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993))).
144
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receive an individualized assessment of their oral health by a dentist.”152
Finding “some relationship (however imperfect) between the Commission’s
rule” and inconclusive evidence that LED lights may harm consumers, the
court deferred to the record and held that the licensing rule did not deprive
the plaintiffs of due process or equal protection.153
In dicta, the court assumed for the sake of argument that the licensing
regulation’s sole purpose was economic protectionism to weigh in on the
issue of whether such protectionism constitutes a legitimate state interest.154
It joined the Tenth Circuit by concluding that pure “economic favoritism is
rational for purposes of our review of state action under the Fourteenth
Amendment,” explaining that its decision was “guided by precedent,
principle, and practicalities.”155
In short, the courts of appeals disagree over the normative premises
that have motivated, and should motivate, the Supreme Court to engage in
credibility-questioning rational basis review. Part III seeks to resolve that
disagreement.
III.   CREDIBILITY-QUESTIONING RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW AND
ECONOMIC LEGISLATION
The specter of implicit normative premises looms behind every
application of rational basis review.156 A shift from deferential rational
basis review to credibility-questioning review, then, is a shift of normative
priorities.157 The “invocation of ‘rationality’ masks the processes that are
actually at work,” because virtually any statute can be upheld as rational.158
As such, an issue courts confront when subjecting economic legislation to
rational basis review—be it of the deferential or credibility-questioning
variety—is whether such legislation promotes a goal worth pursuing.
Determining which normative premises have and should lead the
Supreme Court to apply credibility-questioning rational basis review is the
152

Id. at 285.
Id.
154
See id. at 286.
155
Id. Regarding precedent, the court explained that “[t]he simple truth is that the Supreme Court
has long permitted state economic favoritism of all sorts.” Id. It also pointed out that “much of what
states do is to favor certain groups over others on economic grounds. We call this politics.” Id. at 287.
156
See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, DOMA, Romer, and Rationality, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 923, 932
(2010) (stating that several cases challenging the Defense of Marriage Act “display[] the implicit
normative premises of rational basis analysis”).
157
Cf. id. at 924 (explaining that the cultural “shift is really one of normative priorities”).
158
Id. at 924; see id. at 932 (“A law that bans the driving of blue Volkswagens on Tuesdays is
rationally—indeed, perfectly—related to the purpose of preventing blue Volkswagens from being
driven on Tuesdays.”).
153
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issue that needs solving. This Part proposes a solution. It first argues that
the normative premises behind the Supreme Court’s use of credibilityquestioning rational basis review justify its use for economic legislation
that implicates those premises. These premises include a presumption
against legislation that impedes liberty interests central to personhood and
legislation that burdens politically unpopular minority groups. Next, this
Part argues that the ius gentium and public choice theory support
credibility-questioning review of economic legislation that results from
industry capture.
A.   The Normative Premises Currently Behind the Supreme Court’s
Application of Credibility-Questioning Rational Basis Review
Two premises have formed the basis of the Supreme Court’s
application of credibility-questioning rational basis review: a presumption
against legislation that impedes liberty interests central to personhood and a
presumption against legislation that burdens politically unpopular minority
groups. The three cases discussed in Part I—Department of Agriculture v.
Moreno, Lawrence v. Texas, and United States v. Windsor159—evidence
these two concerns. While Lawrence and Windsor require credibilityquestioning review of legislation that restricts liberty interests central to
personhood, Moreno and Windsor demand such review of legislation that
burdens politically unpopular minority groups.160 The decisions thus
represent a shift in normative priorities and of goals worth pursuing that did
not previously exist within the rigid architecture of Carolene Products.
1.   A Presumption Against Legislation that Impedes Liberty Interests
Central to Personhood
Only after the Lawrence and Windsor majorities explained that the
legislation at issue restricted liberty interests did they apply credibilityquestioning review. In both cases, the Supreme Court repeatedly described
the regulated behavior at issue by referencing personal dignity and
autonomy. Lawrence, for example, opens not by cabining the discussion to
same-sex private conduct but by explaining in broad language that “[t]he
instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its more
transcendent dimensions.”161 Building on the themes of dignity and
159

See supra Section I.B.
See Raynor, supra note 1, at 1089–101. While Raynor characterizes what this Note identifies as
credibility-questioning rational basis review as “second-order” review, he argues that “[r]egulations that
contravene certain specified autonomy interests or that are motivated by animus merit review under the
second-order rational basis test.” Id. at 1068.
161
539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). The Court also quoted a similarly broad statement regarding liberty
interests from Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992), further underscoring
160
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autonomy, the Lawrence Court explained that the restriction at issue
violated the Fourteenth Amendment not because of the specific conduct it
prohibited but because it “demean[ed] [petitioners’] existence” and
“control[led] their destiny” by criminalizing their private conduct.162 In
addition, the Windsor Court explained that the Lawrence Court’s concern
with the challenged law demeaning the petitioners’ existence was related
not just to sexual choices but also to other moral choices as well.163 The
Court’s endorsement of credibility-questioning review of legislation that
restricts liberty interests central to personhood is further underscored by
Windsor’s recognition that under both the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, the government does not have “the power to degrade or
demean.”164
While Lawrence and Windsor address statutes related to same-sex
behavior, the broad descriptions of liberty interests in both cases extend to
several economic liberty interests, including occupational freedom.
Commenting on Lawrence, Austin Raynor correctly notes that the decision
“expresses a heightened level of judicial solicitude for liberty interests that
are crucial to individual flourishing, regardless of the specific content of
those interests.”165 So too of Windsor, which is replete with references to
dignity.166 Thus, as Raynor notes, “economic freedoms clearly are not
disqualified from inclusion in the category of rights ‘central to personal
dignity and autonomy.’”167
Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that the right to work is “of
the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the
purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure.”168 This makes sense,
given that the ability to choose one’s career free from entry barriers often

the notion that the Court has not sought to cabin its descriptions of personal dignity and autonomy
solely to any one issue. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (“These matters, involving the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State.”).
162
Id. at 578.
163
133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (explaining that DOMA “demeans the couple, whose moral and
sexual choices the Constitution protects”).
164
Id. at 2695.
165
Raynor, supra note 1, at 1079.
166
See, e.g., 133 S. Ct. at 2694 (“Responsibilities, as well as rights, enhance the dignity and
integrity of the person.”).
167
Raynor, supra note 1, at 1079 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
851 (1992)).
168
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
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brought about by inside groups is, in the words of the Lawrence Court,
“central to personal dignity and autonomy.”169 That is at least in part
because careers are often at the center of many persons’ lives. As such, the
ability to freely choose an occupation absent undue state interference
enables one to fully realize his or her interests and ambitions. Because
occupational freedom is tied to liberty interests central to personhood,
Lawrence and Windsor support the application of credibility-questioning
rational basis review to certain economic legislation, including
occupational licensing measures.
2.   A Presumption Against Legislation that Burdens Politically
Unpopular Minority Groups
Moreno and Windsor require credibility-questioning review of
legislation that burdens politically unpopular minority groups. Central to
the Court’s holding in Moreno was the idea that “if the constitutional
conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the
very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”170
This idea—colloquially referred to as the “animus principle”171—reflects
the fact that the lower a group’s political influence, the higher “the danger
that the statute in question was the product of an impermissible
motivation.”172 The animus principle was also central to the Court’s
decision in Windsor,173 as it was in at least two other credibility-questioning
cases.174 In sum, both Moreno and Windsor indicate that laws motivated by
animus or the desire to harm a politically unpopular group justify the
application of credibility-questioning rational basis review.
Moreno and Windsor instruct that the politically unpopular groups the
Constitution protects from harm and animus include those individuals
169

539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (citation omitted).
413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
171
See, e.g., Jane S. Schacter, Romer v. Evans and Democracy’s Domain, 50 VAND. L. REV. 361,
379–81 (1997).
172
Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1715
(1984).
173
The Windsor Court began its discussion by explaining that “[t]he Constitution’s guarantee of
equality ‘must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular
group cannot’ justify disparate treatment of that group.” 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (quoting Moreno,
413 U.S. at 534–35).
174
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (striking down a state constitutional amendment
because “its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems
inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to
legitimate state interests”); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446–47 (1985)
(“[S]ome objectives—such as a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group—are not legitimate
state interests.” (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted)).
170
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locked out of economic opportunities due to laws motivated by animus or
the desire to harm a politically unpopular group. Take occupational
licensing measures, for example. When protected classes seek enrichment
by advocating for occupational licensing measures, members of the
nonprotected class are harmed. And harm to would-be competitors is a
necessary component of many occupational licensing measures, given that
such measures are often primarily motivated by the desire to protect
existing providers’ profits by restricting market entry and competition.
Frequently, then, there is an essential connection between the enrichment
of the protected class and the injury to the nonprotected class.
Nevertheless, it may be argued that an intent to protect an “in-group”
from competition is not itself an intent to harm “out-groups” and thus that
occupational licensing measures fall outside of the animus principle’s
ambit.175 However, the Supreme Court itself has recognized that benefits ingroups obtain from occupational licensing measures such as the one at
issue in Sensational Smiles require injury to out-groups. In Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, for example, the Court labeled the distinction
between benefits to the in-group and harm to the out-group as “a distinction
without a difference.”176 The Court did so by citing Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v.
Dias, in which the Court noted that a law’s constitutionality “does not
depend upon whether one focuses upon the benefited or the burdened
party . . . . [I]t could always be said that there was no intent to impose a
burden on one party, but rather the intent was to confer a benefit on the
other.”177 This plainly squares with the fact that increases in in-group profits
that result from occupational licensing measures are directly correlated
with harm to out-groups.178 Harm to the out-group, then, is a necessary
component of licensing regimes. Such regimes should thus be analyzed
under credibility-questioning rational basis review.
One may further argue that Moreno and Windsor cannot be stretched
to cover routine legislative classifications, such as those made by economic
regulations like occupational licensing measures. After all, legislation
inherently classifies. As an initial matter, however, economic regulations,
including licensing measures, routinely exceed their seemingly benignant
175

A similar argument was made in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869
(1985), a case in which the Supreme Court struck down a law that taxed out-of-state insurance
companies at a higher rate than in-state insurance companies. The intervenors argued that a clear
distinction existed between benefit to the in-group (domestic insurers) and harm to the out-group
(foreign insurers). See Brief for Appellee-Intervenors at 42, Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869
(1985) (No. 83-1274).
176
470 U.S. at 882.
177
468 U.S. 263, 273 (1984).
178
See id.
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economic classifications. Licensing measures have been used to subjugate
minority groups since the Civil War. Since then, “white interest groups
[have] used occupational licensing laws to stifle black economic
progress.”179 For example, labor unions once refused to admit AfricanAmericans into apprenticeship programs,180 and evidence suggests that
similar strategies have continued in the modern era.181 Because many of
those seeking to enter licensed industries are a type of politically unpopular
group that the Constitution aims to protect from harm and animus, Moreno
and Windsor require credibility-questioning rational basis review of
occupational licensing measures.
Furthermore, as Raynor notes, nowhere in Moreno did the Court
phrase its central holding by referencing “the traditional distinction
between economic and noneconomic regulations.”182 The same is true of
Windsor. The two decisions thus reflect the “broad and trans-substantive”
nature of the animus principle: “it applies without regard to subject
matter.”183
B.   The Normative Premises that Support the Application of CredibilityQuestioning Rational Basis Review to Certain Economic Legislation
Having identified what normative premises have led the Supreme
Court to apply credibility-questioning rational basis review, the inquiry
thus turns to what additional premises should lead the Court to do so. The
following identifies two such premises: the ius gentium and public choice
theory, each of which supports credibility-questioning review of economic
legislation that benefits concentrated interest groups at the expense of
diffuse majorities.
1.   The Ius Gentium
In Roper v. Simmons, Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the
majority, stated that “[t]he opinion of the world community, while not
controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant
confirmation for our own conclusions.”184 Justice Kennedy’s reference to
179

David E. Bernstein, Licensing Laws: A Historical Example of the Use of Government
Regulatory Power Against African-Americans, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 89, 90 (1994).
180
Id.
181
Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 18 (1976)
(explaining that licensing exams are often administered only in English to the detriment of citizens that
speak Spanish and that “economically deprived young people cannot easily meet the qualifications
demanded of applicants, such as paying tuition to pseudo-professional schools”).
182
Raynor, supra note 1, at 1083.
183
Id.
184
543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).

514

112:487 (2017)

Rationalizing Rational Basis Review

foreign law in that decision—“the stark reality [is] that the United States is
the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the
juvenile death penalty”185—generated significant controversy.186 However,
prior to Roper, the Court had referenced foreign law for nearly 200 years.
Chief Justice John Marshall, for example, authored several decisions that
did so.187 Since 1804, at least thirty-five Supreme Court decisions have
considered foreign law, with seventeen occurring after 1940.188 So at least
in the positivist sense, the Roper majority’s reference to foreign law was
not out of bounds.189
Recent scholarship has discussed the relevance of foreign law in
American courts.190 Professor Steven Calabresi and Bradley Silverman, for
example, argue that “there is inherent value in looking to other sovereign
nation states’ courts to see how they have resolved the difficult questions
that have arisen in our own legal system.”191 The idea is that when foreign
statutes, constitutional provisions, and precedents converge into a “law of
nations,” or ius gentium, a normative consensus has emerged that can
provide American judges with a wider knowledge base upon which certain
constitutional ambiguities may be resolved.192
As an initial and important caveat, the ius gentium is applicable as an
interpretive modality only if the meaning of the constitutional provision at
issue is “underdeterminate”.193 The content, and thus the meaning, of the

185

Id. at 575.
See Steven G. Calabresi & Bradley G. Silverman, Hayek and the Citation of Foreign Law: A
Response to Professor Jeremy Waldron, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 4.
187
See Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources
of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 743, 763 (2005).
188
Calabresi & Silverman, supra note 186, at 7–8. Calabresi and Silverman have noted that
“[s]even majority opinions and one dissent used foreign law between 1804 and 1840,” and that
“[b]etween 1840 and 1890, at least four majority opinions relied on foreign law.” Id. at 5–6. Moreover,
“[b]etween 1890 and 1940, at least seven Supreme Court opinions cited foreign law.” Id. at 6.
189
Cf. William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2408 n.5 (2015)
(describing legal positivism as the view that “the content of the law is determined by certain present
social facts and that moral considerations do not necessarily play a role in making legal statements true
or false”).
190
See, e.g., Calabresi & Silverman, supra note 186.
191
Id. at 17–18.
192
See, e.g., id. at 18–19, 65 (“We posit that the ius gentium’s development is analogous to a
spontaneous order in that it ‘constantly adapts itself, and functions through adapting itself, to millions of
facts which in their entirety are not known to anybody.’ For this reason, as Hayek makes clear, it may
be information and knowledge superior in the way that a market is superior to a Soviet-style planned
economy.”) (quoting 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 13 (1973))).
193
See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 462, 473 (1987) (“The law is underdeterminate with respect to a given case if and only if the set
186
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constitutional text is determined, or “fixed,” at the time the portion of that
text is framed and ratified, and that fixed content must limit, or “constrain,”
subsequent interpretations of the constitutional text.194 But when there is an
“absence of determinate” meaning in the constitutional text, that “meaning
must be ‘constructed.’”195
With the above caveat in mind, the ius gentium is an appropriate
method of constitutional construction so long as the meaning of the
constitutional text “incorporates or permits” it.196 So, while foreign law
does not, and should not, bind American judges,197 it can serve a useful
purpose in constitutional construction when the meaning of the
constitutional text “runs out”;198 namely, “as a system of spontaneous legal
order [better] able to process larger amounts of disparate bits of
information than any central planner could.”199
The ius gentium is particularly relevant for this Note’s argument that
courts should apply credibility-questioning rational basis review when
scrutinizing certain types of economic legislation for two reasons.200 First,

of results in the case that can be squared with the legal materials is a nonidentical subset of the set of all
imaginable results.”).
194
Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453,
459 (2013).
195
Cf. Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 611 (2004).
196
Cf. Baude, supra note 189, at 2355 (explaining that “judges can look to precedent, policy, or
practice, but only to the extent that the original meaning incorporates or permits them”).
197
Calabresi & Silverman, supra note 186, at 31 (“The Framers of the Constitution and of the
Reconstruction Amendments can hardly be supposed to have consented to be governed by the law of
other twenty-first century sovereign nation states, and the U.S. Constitution, unlike other foreign
constitutions, does not allow for international or foreign law to be made binding in the United States.”).
198
See Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 69
(2011).
199
Calabresi & Silverman, supra note 186, at 64.
200
The justification for judicial reference to the ius gentium is outside of the scope of this Note and
may be found elsewhere. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence,
Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109, 111 (2005) (“[C]onsidering foreign and international
law within a framework of learning by engagement . . . is a legitimate interpretive tool that offers
modest benefits . . . .”); Bradley Silverman, The Legitimacy of Comparative Constitutional Law: A
Modal Evaluation, 24 MICH. ST. INT’L. L. REV. 307, 354 (2016) (“[A]s a general matter, it is
constitutionally legitimate to cite foreign law for persuasive purposes, but not as binding authority.”);
Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (2005)
(“[T]o ignore foreign solutions, or to refrain from attending to them because they are foreign, betokens
not just an objectionable parochialism, but an obtuseness as to the nature of the problems we face.”).
But see John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 1175, 1246 (2007) (“Only those international obligations that have been validated by domestic
political processes should be part of our law because they alone can avoid the democracy deficit of raw
international law.”).
But the caveat that judges may refer to the ius gentium only when the meaning of the constitutional
text at issue is underdeterminate bears repeating. See supra notes 193–198 and accompanying text.
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the Supreme Court has invoked the ius gentium in discussing when
credibility-questioning rational basis review is appropriate. Lawrence, for
example, pointed to a 1957 British Parliamentary report that recommended
the repeal of laws punishing same-sex conduct.201 The opinion also
discussed the European Court of Human Rights’s invalidation of a
Northern Irish law that forbade same-sex conduct.202 Moreover, the
Lawrence Court explained that the right the plaintiff in that case sought
“has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other
countries,” and that “[t]here ha[d] been no showing that . . . the
governmental interest in circumscribing personal choice is somehow more
legitimate or urgent” in the United States.203 Second, among the
constitutional democracies of the world, the United States’ failure to
protect occupational freedom is “almost exceptional.”204 Other
constitutional democracies—including Germany, Japan, South Africa,
Israel, the European Union, and Brazil—do so energetically.205
Examining the consensus of foreign law in cases implicating
underdeterminate—and only underdeterminate—constitutional provisions
can prove useful, because “[t]he fact that so many nations, markedly
different in other respects, all reach the same legal outcome may indicate
that there is something inherently wise, just, or efficient about it.”206 One
such underdeterminate constitutional provision is the Equal Protection
Clause,207 the alleged violations of which are often subject to rational basis
review. And a normative global consensus, though hardly unanimous, is
forming regarding the judicial review of one particular type of economic
legislation: that which regulates occupational freedom. While the concept
of credibility-questioning review of economic legislation does not form the
entire basis of foreign consensus, the various explicit protections of
occupational freedom in foreign constitutions and other legal sources
suggest that a more searching judicial review of certain economic
legislation in American courts is sometimes warranted.

201

539 U.S. 558, 572–73 (2003).
See id. at 573 (discussing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19–20
(1981)).
203
Id. at 577.
204
STEVEN GOW CALABRESI ET AL., THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 1446 (2016).
205
Id. at 1441.
206
Calabresi & Silverman, supra note 186, at 68.
207
See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 98 (1980)
(describing the text of the Equal Protection Clause as “unforthcoming with details”).
202
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a.   Germany
In Germany, occupational freedom is constitutionally protected and is
a foundational right central to other freedoms.208 Article 12 of the German
Basic Law provides that “[a]ll Germans shall have the right freely to
choose their occupation or profession, their place of work and their place of
training.”209 For the most part, the right to occupational freedom in
Germany can only be limited by statute.210 Germany’s Federal
Constitutional Court has held that purely protectionist measures that are
enacted solely to protect entrenched practitioners from competition cannot
alone provide a basis for restrictions on job entry.211 Thus, the normative
premise behind Germany’s Basic Law is individual autonomy.212 This
premise has guided the Federal Constitutional Court’s review of
occupational restrictions, which resembles credibility-questioning rational
basis review.213
In a case with facts nearly identical to Lee Optical and decided only
thirty-nine months later, the Federal Constitutional Court stated that purely
protectionist licensing measures are “crude and most radical.”214 The
licensing measure at issue was said to protect public health, but the Court
skeptically addressed the underlying record and found the measure to be a
thinly veiled attempt to prevent competition, explaining that “[e]very
individual has the right to take up any activity that he or she feels prepared
to undertake as an ‘occupation.’”215 While the Court held that occupational
regulations were not per se unconstitutional—“[t]he practice of an
occupation may be restricted by reasonable regulations predicated on
considerations of the common good”—it explained that pure economic
protectionism was not a common good.216 This was particularly the case,
208

DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 299 (1994).
GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 12 (Ger.),
translated in BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ UND FÜR VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ [FEDERAL MINISTRY
OF JUSTICE AND CONSUMER PROTECTION], http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html
[https://perma.cc/6KWM-X6NP].
210
CURRIE, supra note 208, at 299–300.
211
Id. at 300–01. In American judicial terms, to the German Federal Constitutional Court, pure
economic protectionism is not a legitimate government interest. See supra note 114 and accompanying
text.
212
See CURRIE, supra note 208, at 299 (“Like the right to property, occupational freedom is taken
very seriously in Germany as an element of individual autonomy . . . .”).
213
Cf. DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 659 (3d ed. 2012) (explaining that the German Constitutional
Court “has been extremely active in reviewing the constitutionality of laws” affecting market entry).
214
Id. at 669.
215
Id. at 666.
216
Id. at 668.
209
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the Court reasoned, because occupational choice represents “an act of selfdetermination” and “must be protected as much as possible from state
encroachment.”217 As such, the Court critically evaluated the record to find
the licensing measure unconstitutional.218
b.   Japan
Similar to Article 12 of the German Basic Law, Japan’s Constitution
expressly protects occupational freedom. Article 22 of the Constitution of
Japan stipulates that “[e]very person shall have freedom to choose and
change his residence and to choose his occupation to the extent that it does
not interfere with the public welfare.”219 Like Germany’s Federal
Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Japan has also engaged in
credibility-questioning review of economic legislation.
In 1972, the Supreme Court of Japan considered the requirements of
Article 22 when it treated with skepticism the underlying record of a law
that authorized the denial of licenses to pharmacies situated near existing
pharmacies.220 The Japanese Supreme Court employed a framework of
judicial review similar to the credibility-questioning review the Fifth, Sixth,
and Ninth Circuits applied in St. Joseph Abbey, Craigmiles, and Merrifield,
respectively.221 Regarding occupational licensing measures, the Japan
Supreme Court noted that “the purpose, necessity, content and the nature
and content of the freedom of the occupation being restricted by [the
licensing measures], as well as the extent of the restriction, must be studied,
and the decision made cautiously after comparative consideration.”222 After
examining the record, the Court upheld the law as a valid exercise of the
government’s police power to protect the public welfare because it was a
“necessary and reasonable measure[] for an important public interest.”223 In
upholding the law as necessary and reasonable, the Court suggested that
pure economic protectionism was not a legitimate government interest.224
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c.   South Africa
South Africa provides similar protections against economic legislation
that regulates occupational freedom.225 Like Article 12 of the German Basic
Law and Article 22 of the Japanese Constitution, Article 22 of the South
African Constitution provides that “[e]very citizen has the right to choose
their trade, occupation or profession freely.”226 And like the high courts of
Germany and Japan, South Africa’s has thoroughly reviewed such
legislation in a manner similar to credibility-questioning rational basis
review.
In 1997, the Constitutional Court of South Africa reviewed a
challenge to a liquor licensing law that the plaintiffs argued interfered with
their constitutional right to work.227 The Court looked to the underlying
record when it reviewed both the legitimacy of the government’s purpose
and the fit between that purpose and the means of achieving it.228
Ultimately, the Court held that the law, which required a license for a
grocer to sell liquor, was rationally related to the government’s purpose of
“combatting the adverse effects of alcohol consumption” and was thus
constitutional.229
d.   Brazil
Finally, Article 5 of Brazil’s Constitution secures the right to freedom
of occupation with its declaration that “the practice of any work, trade or
profession is free, observing the professional qualifications which the law
shall establish.”230 In 2011, the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court examined
the constitutionality of a statute that required lawyers to successfully pass a
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national bar.231 After engaging in a credibility-questioning style of review,
the Court held that the licensing measure was constitutional because it did
not “reach the core of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of work.”232
The Brazilian Supreme Federal Court also examined the legitimacy of
the government’s purpose in enacting the statute and the fit between that
purpose and the means of achieving it. In doing so, the Court explained that
“the free exercise of profession is a fundamental right of high significance
in the constitutional context” because “the guarantee is closely linked to the
construction of personality.”233 The Court stated that while one’s “freedom
of profession is a part of setting up personal life, without which free
personal development would be unimaginable,” the licensing measure was
constitutional because the profession of law is “beyond the subjective
dimension.”234 It therefore directly questioned why the government chose to
restrict entry into the practice of law before upholding the licensing
measure as constitutional, a critical component of credibility-questioning
rational basis review.
*

*

*

The nondeferential review that the highest courts of these and other
countries have applied to economic legislation is an example of an
emerging normative consensus that American courts may consider in
reviewing economic legislation that implicates underdeterminate
constitutional provisions. The Supreme Court has previously referenced the
ius gentium when employing credibility-questioning review,235 and
nondeferential judicial review of economic legislation has increased
globally since then.
2.   Public Choice Theory and Industry Capture
The “new realism” of the political process—what Judge Richard
Posner has described as a process in which much legislation is the result of
“a pure power struggle” won by “pressure groups”236—seriously
undermines the application of deferential rational basis review to economic
legislation, which is often the result of industry capture. This insight,
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perhaps best encapsulated by public choice theory, cuts against the
Supreme Court’s decades-long confidence that “political processes . . . can
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation.”237
Public choice theory explains that “homo economicus and homo
politicus are one and the same.”238 That is, the rational and self-interested
nature of a free market actor does not change when he or she assumes
public office. Instead, elected officials’ motivations largely track those of
individuals in the market. As such, public choice theory brings with it the
“presumption that persons do not readily become economic eunuchs as
they shift from market to political participation.”239 In both contexts, parties
seek to promote their welfare, either by maximizing monetary profits in the
private sector or by maximizing power in the public sector. Consequently,
“[a]ll reasonably sophisticated persons know that a well-knit special
interest group is likely to prevail over an amorphous ‘public’ whose
members are dispersed and, as individuals, are not in sharp conflict with
the organized interest.”240
Public choice theory is particularly relevant in the context of
occupational licensing, which over the past several decades has grown
exponentially. In 1950, about a decade before public choice theory was
born,241 less than 5% of workers were required to obtain state licenses
before entering a profession.242 In 2008, however, 29% of all workers were
licensed by the government.243 And while licensed professions include the
more obvious ones such as doctors and lawyers,244 such professions now
include innocuous trades ranging from interior designing to
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auctioneering.245 That the number of professions licensed in at least one
state has grown by more than 37% percent since the 1980s underscores the
explosion in the licensing of these and other similarly benign professions.246
Public choice theory explains that many licensing regimes belie their
consumer protection justifications and are instead economically
protectionist and prone to industry capture. For example, typically it is the
occupational class itself, rather than the legislature or public, who argues
for the enactment of licensing measures.247 And professional licensing
board members are often members of the regulated occupation, an
arrangement that permits board members to exclude potential market
entrants.248 Indeed, market exclusion and suppression of competition is
often the primary motivation for established firms to advocate for the
imposition of licensing measures.249 Moreover, the social and economic
costs of widespread licensing measures bring into serious doubt the Second
and Tenth Circuits’ judicial approach to the review of such measures.250
Licensing regulations decrease consumer choice and increase prices.251
Because of increased prices, the most disadvantaged in society become
even more disadvantaged.252 Furthermore, because market entry is
restricted, employment growth declines.253
With the spate of recent circuit court cases applying credibilityquestioning rational review to economic regulations, the implications of the
new realism may be forming the basis of a normative shift away from the
application of deferential rational basis review to special interest economic
legislation. Professor Steven Menashi and Judge Douglas Ginsburg have
noted that a similar normative shift occurred in antitrust law in the late
1970s.254 Until then, the Supreme Court promoted “vague and frankly anti-
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competitive social and political goals.”255 But a “new learning” in antitrust
economics was developed by a group of scholars who argued that antitrust
laws should focus on economic efficiency and consumer welfare rather
than economic protectionism for its own sake.256 This idea eventually
gained institutional favor as the Court interpreted antitrust laws to reflect
the new learning by focusing on the promotion of consumer welfare and
economic efficiency.257 Originalists and nonoriginalists have welcomed this
shift, which has “broad and nonpartisan agreement” throughout the legal
profession and the courts.258 A similar evolution appears to be at work
regarding the judicial review of interest group economic legislation,
perhaps partially evidenced by judicial acquiescence to the “great
transformation” of regulated industries that began several decades ago.259
While inserting public choice theory into the mix of judicial review
may seem unmoored from judicial and constitutional tradition, the idea of
scrutinizing economic legislation that results from industry capture does
not require great leaps to new judicial heights. Instead, once the insight of
public choice theory is acknowledged—that small, concentrated interest
groups can, and frequently do, dominate diffuse majorities—enhanced
judicial review of particular types of economic legislation comports with
and is arguably required by Carolene Products’ concern with, as John Hart
Ely put it, “clearing the channels of political change.”260 Professor Bruce
Ackerman has explained, for example, that “the concerns that underlie
Carolene should lead judges to protect . . . groups that are ‘anonymous and
diffuse’ rather than ‘discrete and insular.’ It is these groups that . . . are
systematically disadvantaged in a pluralist democracy.”261
For purposes of the task at hand, the key implication of public choice
theory is that the negative effects that can result from protectionist
legislation, including occupational licensing measures, are often preserved
like flies in amber. Because the negative costs of such measures are widely
dispersed, the legislative process is generally unable to “bring about repeal
of undesirable legislation.”262 When such legislative reform is unlikely or
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impossible, then, courts should apply credibility-questioning rational basis
review.
3.   The Ghost of Lochner
While a “bad constitutional odor” may be associated with credibilityquestioning rational basis review of economic legislation,263 such review is
not akin to Lochner. Rather, the application of credibility-questioning
rational basis review to the type of legislation this Note discusses gets at
“the problem of faction,” which commentators have recognized as “central
to the American constitutional design.”264 In addition, credibilityquestioning review of economic legislation that results from concentrated
interest groups satisfies the non-Lochnerian reason courts apply rational
basis review in the first place, which is “to filter out naked preferences.”265
Both rational basis review and credibility-questioning review of
occupational licensing measures are therefore “closely related to the central
constitutional concern of ensuring against capture of government power by
faction.”266
Credibility-questioning rational basis review of certain economic
legislation does not, and need not, reflect a return to Lochner-style review.
Such review does not supplant legislatures’ regulatory agendas, nor does it
ask courts to “elevate [their] economic theor[ies] over [those] of legislative
bodies.”267 This is partially the case, as the Sixth Circuit has noted, because
credibility-questioning review does not require “sophisticated economic
analysis,” but instead only a recognition of “naked attempt[s] to raise . . .
fortress[es] protecting” entrenched interests at the expense of diffuse
majorities.268
Moreover, credibility-questioning rational basis review is not a tool
judges can easily use to imprint their personal judgments on the law.
Enhanced review does not result in per se findings that all economic
regulations,
including
occupational
licensing
measures,
are
unconstitutional. Rather, such regulations can pass constitutional muster by
satisfying the two requirements of credibility-questioning review: First, the
court must determine that the government’s asserted interest is
constitutionally permissible and that the asserted interest is what actually
motivated the legislature. Second, the court must then determine that “the
263
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relationship between the government’s stated objective and the means
chosen to pursue it” fit snugly together.269 Investigations into legislative
motives and means–end fits are not novel concepts of judicial review that
would introduce previously nonexistent judicial freewheeling.
The ghost of Lochner does not haunt credibility-questioning rational
basis review. Rather, such review is a proper means of determining
whether, as Justice John Marshall Harlan stated, “[the] measure bears a
rational relation to a constitutionally permissible objective.”270 The answer
to “that question is well within Article III’s confines of judicial review.”271
CONCLUSION
The courts of appeals are divided over whether the factual records
underlying certain economic legislation should be analyzed under
credibility-questioning rational basis review. Such review of economic
legislation that impedes central liberty interests and burdens politically
unpopular groups is warranted, given the normative premises behind the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,
Lawrence v. Texas, and United States v. Windsor. In addition, the “law of
nations,” or ius gentium, and public choice theory support credibilityquestioning review of economic legislation that benefits concentrated
interest groups at the expense of diffuse majorities. Consequently, courts
should treat the records of these types of economic legislation with a
healthy dose of skepticism.
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